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Freudenthal: Federal Non-Reserved Water Rights

COMMENT
FEDERAL NON-RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
On June 25, 1979, Leo Krulitz, Solicitor of the United
States Department of Interior, issued a formal opinion on
"Federal Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish
and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation and the Bureau
of Land Management."' The Solicitor explained the purpose
of the Opinion: "[M] y office has undertaken a comprehensive
analysis of the reserved water rights which may be asserted
on the federal lands administered by NPS, FWS, Reclamation and BLM." ' In fact, the Opinion goes further, and
attempts to set forth a doctrinal basis for federal nonreserved right claims to water. While the primary focus of
the Opinion is a restatement of the established doctrine of
non-Indian reserved rights, most professional attention has
been devoted to the assertion of a new and alternative basis
for federal claims to water. The Solicitor defines the rights
as "water rights obtained through appropriation and use
for Congressionaly authorized purposes."' Criticism of the
Opinion's treatment of non-Indian reserved rights was
limited to disagreements about the application of the doctrines in specific areas. However, the assertion of Federal
water rights based on inference from Congressional purpose
created the most severe political outcry from the Western
water community since President Carter announced his
water project hit list. But there is more to this response
than politics; Western water lawyers and administrators
have questioned the legal basis and the workability of the
doctrine.
This comment is directed to the Solicitor's new doctrine.
The Solicitor's discussion of reserved rights is considered
only to the extent that the assumptions made therein relate
to the assertion of rights of appropriation for Congressionally
authorized purposes. Primary focus is directed to: I. the
Copyrigh@

1980 by the University of Wyoming

1. SOL. Op.
(June 25, 1979), "Federal Water Rights of
the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation and the Bureau of Land Management." [hereinafter cited as
OPINION]

2. Id. at 1.
3. I& at 15.
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historical and legal context of the Opinion; II. the conceptual
basis of the new right; III. the Solicitor's use of authorities;
and IV. practical dimensions of the Opinion. The analysis
leads to three conclusions, the merits of which will eventually
be tested by the courts and practical experience. The conclusions are:
(1) The assertion of appropriation for Congressional
purpose is at best a formal statement of the Solicitor's position, not the enunciation of an established legal doctrine.
(2) The reasoning on which the appropriation for
Congressional purpose doctrine rests is flawed.
(3) If the courts were to accept the Solicitor's position,
the operational and functional results would be disastrous.
I.

THE CONTEXT OF THE SOLICITOR'S OPINION

4

Western water law is a shifting concoction of legal
principles, American Westward expansion policies, the politics of federalism, and the natural limitations of climate and
hydrology. While the interplay of these forces has created
confusing and often conflicting statements from Congress
and the courts, the system as a whole has maintained a
reasonable balance with a strong role for state governments.
The confusion did not disrupt the balance prior to the early
1960's, in part because the Western states had not reached
the physical limits of their water resources. Further, major
federal claims to Western water were not vigorously asserted
prior to the extension of federal reserved water rights to
5
non-Indian federal reservations in Arizona v. California.
New forces of national significance, including population
shifts and national energy programs, have destroyed any
illusions of water sufficiency. These new forces threaten to
irrevocably upset the present balance, to the long-standing
detriment of the states. In a larger context, tensions origi4. For a more detailed treatment of the origins of state water law, see
TRELEASE,

FEDERAL-STATE

RELATIONS

IN

WATER

LAW

(Working

Paper

No. 5, Prepared for the National Water Commission, Sept. 7, 1971),
[hereinafter cited as TRELEASE] and WHEATLEY, STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT,

MANAGEMENT AND USE OF WATER RESOURCES ON THE PUBLIC LANDS,

(1969), [hereinafter cited as WHEATLEY].
5. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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nating from the national debate over the role of resource
conservation and environmental protection in public land
law and policy have made Western states increasingly
nervous about pronouncements from Washington and its
minions.' Thus, the Solicitor's assertion of a new federal
claim to water is viewed as another attempt to shift an
already questionable balance away from the states and
towards the federal government.
Western water law was born of necessity. Social and
economic activity in the semi-arid West is largely dependent
on the availability of water. Lack of rainfall, the need for
storage and the mining practices of the 19th century forced
the early settlers to abandon the established riparian system.
They substituted a system for the orderly recognition and
enforcement of priorities, based on the simple concept that
the first use in time would have a senior priority. This
system was established, and flourished, far beyond the
effective reach of the federal government.
The Congress generally recognized and accepted the
course of this early economic development. Early federal
policies towards the West emphasized settlement and transfer of the public domain to private ownership. Congress not
only legislated to accomplish this transfer, but also explicitly
recognized a Western water law system that effectively
severed the water from the land.7 Congress delegated "responsibility for . . . water to the states . . . back in the 1860's
and 1870's through three acts of Congress."' The Acts of
July 18661 and July 18701" "recognized and sanctioned possessory rights to water on the public lands asserted under
local laws and customs. .. ."" The Desert Land Act of
187712 required "settlers to use appropriation law, not the
common law of riparian rights which might give him a
6.
7.

The Angry West vs. the Rest, Newsweek, September 17, 1979, at 31.
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S.

142 (1935).
8.

Coal Pipeline Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 4370 Before the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Statement by Honorable Leo Krulitz,

Solicitor, U.S. Dept.
9. Act of July 26, 1866,
10. Ac. of July 9, 1870,
11. OPINION, sutpra note
12.

of
14
16
1,

Interior, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979).
Stat. 251.
Stat. 218. 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1970).
at 4.

19 Stat. 377, 43 U.S.C. § 821, et. seq. (1970).
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claim to the entire natural flow, and reserved the surplus
for appropriation by others."'" The Taylor Grazing Act also
contains provisions requiring adherence by water users to
state law. Professor Trelease points out one possible exception to the federal pattern, the National Forest Act of 1897,
which required compliance with state law but "hinted at" a
possible federal alternative: 1"
All waters within the boundaries of national
forests may be used for domestic, mining, milling
or irrigation purposes, under the laws of the state
wherein such national forests are situated, or under
the law of the United States and the rules and
regulations established thereunder."5
Several subsequent Congressional actions continue the
early pattern and contain express provisions upholding
state law. The Supreme Court in United States v. New
Mexico"8 referred to 37 statutes which contained explicit
directives that state water law was to be followed or not
disturbed."
Early Court decisions tended to interpret these Congressional statements broadly in favor of the states."8 However, later decisions, particularly those involving Section 8
of the 1902 Reclamation Act, took a more narrow view of
the Congressional pronouncements.1" Two potentially landmark opinions, U. S. v. New Mexico2" and California v.
U. S.,"' were recently handed down by the Court. Both
decisions reestablish judicial recognition of Congressional
deference to state water law.
Federal reserve rights are consistently cited as the
major exception to federal deference to state water law.
The doctrine originated in a Supreme Court case interpreting the treaty establishing the Ft. Belknap Indian Reserva13. TRELEASE, supra note 4, at 76.
14. Id.

15. 16 U.S.C. § 481 (1964).
16. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 n. 5 (1978).
17. Id.

18. See, Broder v. Natoma Water and Mining Co., 101 U.S. 274 (1879) and
Jennison v. Kirk, 78 U.S. 453 (1878).

19. See, Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
20. United States v. New Mexico, supra note 16.
21. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
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tion in Montana. In Winters v. United States,22 the Court
held that Congress at the time of the treaty intended to
reserve sufficient water from the then unappropriated
waters to accomplish the specific purposes of the reservation.
For many years it was assumed that this doctrine applied
only to Indian reservations. But in 1963, the Supreme Court
expanded the doctrine to include all federal withdrawals of
land regardless of purpose.23 Last year the Court restricted
the amount of the claim to that water necessary to accomplish
only the primary purpose of the reservation. 4
Against this background, enter the Solicitor and the
Opinion which is the subject of this comment. The Solicitor's
initiative was prompted by President Carter's original Federal Water Policy Message to Congress, submitted on June 6,
1978.5 The President's effort to formulate a comprehensive
national water policy listed several initiatives in federal-state
cooperation. Specifically, he issued:
An instruction to Federal agencies to work
promptly and expeditiously to inventory and quantify Federal reserved and Indian water rights. In
several areas of the country, States have been unable to allocate water because these rights have not
been determined. This quantification effort should
focus first on high priority areas, should involve
close consultation with the States and water users
and should emphasize negotiations rather than litigation wherever possible.2"
A related memorandum from President Carter to federal
agencies including the Department of Interior extended this
policy. The memorandum entitled "Federal and Indian Reserved Water Rights" directed the agencies to "[s]eek an
expeditious establishment and quantification of Federal reserved water rights . ."2
Further, the agencies were instructed to "[u]tilize a reasonable standard, when asserting
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
United States v. New Mexico, supra note 16.
PresidentialPapers, Administration of Jimmy Carter, 1978, pp. 1044-1051.
Id., at 1050.
Memorandum from Jimmy Carter to Secretaries of DOI, DOA, HUD,
DOE, Army; Attorney General; Chairman, TVA, Subject: Federal and
Indian Reserved Water Rights, 1 (undated).
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Federal reserved rights, which reflects true Federal needs,
rather than theoretical or hypothetical needs based on the
full legal extension of all possible rights." 8
In consultation with the Justice Department, the Department of Interior prepared the Opinion as part of the
"procedures and standards for the purpose of implementing
[the President's] directives.""0 Because the Opinion is binding on all Interior agencies it will serve as the basis for
quantifying the majority of existing federal claims to Western water. Quantification of rights based on appropriation
for congressional purpose will be extremely difficult. The solicitor's Opinion does not clearly set forth its dimensions or
limitations. Similarly, neither state water law nor federal
reserved rights provide appropriate analogs. The Solicitor's
new claim "arises from actual use of unappropriated water
by the United States to carry out congressionally-authorized
management objectives on federal lands.""0 The use may be
consumptive or nonconsumptive. Unlike a reserved right, no
reservation of land for a particular purpose is necessary to
activate this claim.3t
Limitations on the extent of the right are "[t]he time
of its actual initiation and the purpose and quantity of the
use. .... " Evidently the scope of the Congressional directive determines the upper limit of the appropriation, while
the date of use and the amount actually used establish the
dimensions of the perfected right.3 By comparison, federal
reserved rights arise at the time of the congressional act reserving the land. The size of the right, regardless of the
amount of water actually put to use, is the amount needed to
accomplish the specific purpose of the reservation. The
priority date for reserved rights is the date of congressional
enactment, while the priorities for appropriations for con28. Id., at p. 2.
29.
30.

Id.

OPINION, supra note 1, at 15.
31. Id.
32. ld.
33. The Solicitor refers to both actual use and action leading to an actual
use as key elements of the appropriation. OPINION, eupra note 1, at 15.
This apparent conflict is not resolved in the Opinion.
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gressional purpose are linked to the date of actual use, not
to the date Congress passed the bill containing the objective."
As previously noted,15 the Solicitor's Opinion does not
clearly define the contours of asserted right. Further, the
language is often conflicting or unclear. Conflict exists as
to its priority date. Several phrases are used: "acutal application to a federal use,""6 "date action is taken leading to
an actual use,"3 7 and "time of its actual initiation." 8 It is
not clear what determines the amount of the claim: "purpose" 9 or actual "quantity"" used. Nor does the Opinion
specify what Congressional act trigggers the claim: "congressionally-authorized purposes;"41 "congressionally-authorized management objective;"42 "congressionally-authorized
uses;'.43 "congressionally-sanctioned purposes;"" "manage' "imment objectives specified in congressional directives;"'"
portant congressionally-authorized programs ;,,6 are all mentioned as sufficient. This is more than just semantics. Defining the triggering Congressional action strikes to the heart
of the Congressional intent necessary to delegate authority
to an executive branch agency to establish federal water
rights independent of state law.
Ambiguities in the phrasing of legal doctrines can often
be resolved by reference to the theoretical underpinnings.
Similarly, the prospective operation of a doctrine is best
understood if the conceptual basis is clearly articulated. The
Solicitor's Opinion does not contain such an articulation to
guide federal agencies, the states or the courts in understanding this newly asserted right. As will be seen in the next
section, the Solicitor's Opinion not only lacks a clear statement of its theoretical basis, but it draws indiscriminately
34. The Solicitor does not define the steps necessary to accomplish "actual
use."
35. See, notes 30-33 and related text, supra.
36. OPINION, supra note 1, at 15.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id., at 16.
46. Id.
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on two competing theories of federal power." The resulting
mosaic does not adequately explain or support the new federal
claim to water.
II.

THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF THE SOLICITOR'S OPINION

There are several accepted explanations of the relationship between state and federal governments relative to
water.48 The explanations generally rely on two fundamental
theories. One theory views the federal claim as an exercise
of a federal proprietary interest in the retained federal
public lands and water, and the other relies on the federal
power as sovereign to make use of the water by virtue of
the enumerated powers and the operation of the supremacy
clause.4" Neither theory is adopted as a basis for the newly
asserted right. Vague references to the property clause,50
the supremacy clause"' and historical activities of federal
agencies5 - are insufficient to explain the right's genesis. In
fact, elements of each theory can be found in the Solicitor's
Opinion.
The ProprietaryInterest View
By these 1866 and 1870 Acts, Congress in effect waived its proprietary . . . rights to water
on the public domain to the extent that water is
appropriated by members of the public under state
law .... Thus, these two Acts confine assertion of
inchoate federal water rights to unappropriated
waters that exist at any point in time." (emphasis
added.)
... [T]he United States itself retains a proprietary interest in those waters that have not been appropriated pursuant to state law. The United
47. Authority over water is generally viewed as derived from the federal
power as .overeien or powers bared on the property clau~e.
48. Neither the Opinion nor this comment discusses in detail the federal
authority associated with condemnation, federal enclaves or acquired lands.
49. See, ENGDATIL, Some Observations on State & Federal Control of Natural
Resources, 1979 MINING YEAR BOOK, COLORADO MINING Assoc. 89, for the
suggestion that modern jurisdictional disputes over natural resources have
their genesis in the general failure of law schools to properly explain the
operation of the enumerated powers and the supremacy clause.
50.
51.

OPINION, supra note 1, at 16.

Id.

52. Id., at 15.
53. Id., at 4.
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States therefore retains the power to utilize those
unappropriated waters to carry out the management objectives specified in congressional directives.54 (emphasis added.)
The Sovereign Right to Make Use View
[T]he United States did not divest itself of
its authority, as sovereign, to use the unappropriated waters on the public lands for governmental
purposes.5"
I am of the opinion that . . . comments concerning 'ownership' of the unappropriated water on
the public domain are overly broad and irrelevant
to the right of the United States to make use of such
water, ....
As is the case of 'ownership' of wild
animals, concepts of 'ownership' of unappropriated
waters are not determinative in federal-state relations in non-reserved water rights. See Hughes
v. Oklahoma, S. Ct. No. 77-1439 (April 24, 1979)."
The sovereign right to make use of unappropriated water
on public lands for governmental purposes (which right the
government has never granted away57 ) is different from an
inchoate proprietary interest to all unappropriated waters
that exist on public land at any point in time. Right to
make use allows the government to vest water rights in itself
by appropriating water through a proper exercise of constitutional power, i.e., through proper congressional action
pursuant to an enumerated power.5 Specific congressional
actions under the proper constitutional power necessarily
prevails by operation of the supremacy clause. In this context congressional intent is important, i.e., did Congress intend to occupy the field?"5 Congress must grant the authority
to exercise the right to a federal agency to make use of unappropriated water on public lands. Thus, one must look
for more than a management objective. One must find a
54. Id., at 16.
55. Id., at 9.
56. Id., at 66-67.
57. For an amusing discussion of the inability to grant away sovereign rights,
See, ATTY. GEN. (NEVADA), Equal Footing Doctrine and Its Application
By Congress and the Courts (May, 1977).
58. For further discussion, See, TRELEASE, supra note 4, at 39-70 and 138-147m.
59. Id., at 58.
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specific grant from Congress to use water to accomplish that
management objective. Such grant may be implied, as in the
case of the traditional reserved rights doctrine, or explicit,
as in the congressional grant of authority to the President
to withdraw "lands containing waterholes or other bodies
of water needed or used by the public for watering purposes"6
under authority of the Pickett Act. 1 This view often poses
difficult statutory construction questions (was congressional
action sufficient), but presents no issue as to power.2
A proprietary view allows the federal government to
claim water by perfecting through application to use, the
already vested inchoate federal water right. The only means
by which the federal government can be divested of this
right is through the appropriations of private parties under
state law pursuant to the trilogy of federal acts passed in the
1860's and 18701s.0
From the federal perspective, the mere fact of proper
use will perfect the right in an agency. Here it makes no
sense to talk of congressional intent to appropriate water.
Congress doesn't need to give the agency the right to appropriate because the government never divested itself of its
proprietary interest in unappropriated water on the public
domain. All Congress need do is prescribe a congressional objective for which water could conceivably be useful.
Therefore, the only question, under proprietary interest,
is whether the agency properly applied the unappropriated
water (which the government already owned). The answer
to this question only requires the existence and review of a
management objective. By contrast, under the "right to make
use view," the agency must have the authority to put water
to a particular use. Therefore, one needs to look to the enabling legislation not only to justify the particular use to
which the water was put, but to ascertain the existence
of the authority to put water to any use.
60. OPINION, supra note 1, at 20.
61. 43 U.S.C. § 141.
62. See, United States v. New Mexico, supra note 16.
63. OPINION, supra note 1, at 4, 5, 6.
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Finally, if the "right to make use view" is accepted,
the "proprietary interest view" cannot follow by implication.
The failure of the federal government to divest itself of its
authority to make use does not imply that the federal government retained any property interest in unappropriated water.
Therefore, there must always be an inquiry not only into the
propriety of the use to which the water was put (entailing a
review of the management objective), but also into the scope
of the agency's power to put water to any use. 4
One critical distinction between these views is the degree
of congressional intent which must be present before a federal agency can appropriate water in contravention of state
law. Both views hold that Congress has sufficient power
to independently appropriate water for congressional purposes." The sovereign "right to make use view" expands the
location (to include non-public lands) and purposes (use
justified under any enumerated power); but restricts the
opportunities for federal agencies to exercise the right by
requiring clear expressions of congressional intent to appropriate water and supercede state law. A narrow reading of the intent is applied to determine the amount of
water which can be used.66 The "proprietary interest view,"
as reflected in the Solicitor's Opinion, automatically vests
the right to appropriate water in federal agencies (or that
the delegation of such right is implied in every congressional
directive to federal agencies), but restricts its application
to public lands. The only other restriction, which may
prove insignificant, is that there be some relationship between the appropriation and an agency objective.
The Solicitor's non-reserved federal right contains elements traceable to both theories. Priority dates set by actual
application to federal use, congressionally sanctioned purposes, congressional directives and retained proprietary in64. The agency's power to use water need not be explicitly granted. In the
case of the reservation doctrine, it is implied.
65. Contrary early cases such as Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) were
based on the view that since the constitution did not authorize the U. S.
to acquire water, the power was reserved to the states under the 10th
Amendment. This view no longer prevails. See, U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941). (10th Amendment a truism).
66. See, United States v. New Mexico, supra note 16.
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terest are all linked to the proprietary view of federal rights.
Disregard of state law, emphasis on congressional intent, and
much of the supporting authority actually speak to the right
to use under the supremacy clause. Much of the confusion
about the exact nature of this non-reserved right and its
future application stems from this failure to clearly articulate its basis.
Eventually, the "right to make use view" may prevail
over the "proprietary interest view." In fact the Court, as
pointed out by Professor Trelease, has never really relied on
the federal property view of water as a basis for its decisions. 7 The Solicitor acknowledges that, "As is the case
of 'ownership' of wild animals, concepts of 'ownership' of
unappropriated waters are not determinative on federal-state
relations on non-reserved water rights.""8 Yet he returns to
the notion of an inchoate federal property interest as the
basis for the asserted right. This apparent contradiction
may not have a legal justification. The Western States
Water Council"8 has surmised an alternative explanation.
Namely, since the Court in New Mexico7' denied the federal
government reserved rights claims to instream flows the
Solicitor decided to offer an alternative basis for the claim.
In a draft position paper the Council states that:
Having lost the effort to claim such instream
rights through the reservation doctrine, ....federal
agencies will try . . . to claim that such instream
non-consumptive uses have been 'appropriated' by
the federal government for congressionally authorized purposes and therefore should be upheld
without reference to state substantive law.71
67. TRELEASE, supra note 4, at 139, 147k.
68. OPINION, supra note 1. at 66, cites to Hughes v. Oklahoma, S. Ct. No.
77-1439 (April 24, 1979).
69. The Western States Water Council (WSWC) is a water policy organization consisting of all states west of the 100th Meridian. Its membership
consists of state water officials and citizens appointed by the respective
Governors of each state.
70. United States v. New Mexico, supra note 16.
71. WSWC, Working Draft Response to the Solicitor's Opinion on Federal
Water Rights of June 25, 1979, 19 (Aug. 1979).
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THE OPINION's

TREATMENT

OF AUTHORITIES

The advocacy posture attributed to the Solicitor's Opinion
may also explain the Opinion's unusual treatment of legal
authorities. As legal counsel to the Department of Interior,
the Solocitor is obligated to promote and advocate the policy
position of the Department. In view of this obligation, it is
not surprising that the Solicitor would try to expand federal
claims to water in the arid West. As a general rule, federal
lands would clearly be more productive if added water was
available. But the same rule applies to lands owned by the
states and private parties in the West. The federal government and private parties are competitors for the same resource-water. This section addresses the Solicitor's creative use of legal authorities in advocating expanded claims
to water.
The Opinion relies heavily on U.S. v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co. for the proposition that water rights can be claimed
by the federal government under the "lesser standard, for
water necessary for the beneficial uses of the government
property." (emphasis added.) 72 The underlined language
is contained in a general discussion of the division of authority between states and federal government. The Court
stated:
Although this power of changing the common
law rule as to streams within its dominion undoubtedly belongs to each State, yet two limitations
must be recognized: First, that in the absence of
specific authority from Congress a State cannot by
its legislation destroy the right of the United States,
as the owner of land bordering on a stream, to the
continued flow of its waters; so far at least as may
be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property. Second, (navigation servitude)."
The language is properly referred to as dictum by the
Solicitor, as the case was decided on the basis of the navigation servitude. But the language of Rio Grande was cited in
1978 by the Court in the context of a dispute over non-re72. OPINION, supra note 1, at 19, relies on United States v. Rio Grande Irrig.
Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703, (1899).

73.

United States v. Rio Grande Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
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served, unappropriated water to be impounded by a Bureau
of Reclamation project.7" In California v. United States
the Court held that the State of California could impose any
conditions on the appropriation, control, use and distribution
of water in a federal reclamation project not inconsistent
with clear congressional directives. The Court interpreted the
language of Rio Grande to mean that "except where the reserved rights or navigation servitude of the United States
are invoked, the State has total authority over its internal
waters."7
Treatment of the Rio Grande holding in the two major
cases involving reserved rights also supports an interpretation contrary to the Solicitor's. In Winters v. United States
the Court cited Rio Grande in saying "The power of the
Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could
not be. ' '7' To the same effect in Arizona v. California: "We
have no doubt about the power of the United States under
these clauses to reserve water rights for its reservations and
Neither the Rio Grande decision nor the
its property."7
Court's subsequent treatment of its own language, support
the Solicitor's claim that water is available for use on federal
property under a lesser standard. The only standard found
in these cases is the reserved right standard articulated by
the Court in United States v. New Mexico, water claims for
lands reserved for specific purposes where "without the
water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated."7
The Solicitor attempts to dismiss the Court's recent
interpretation of its own language by referring to the fact
that the Rio Grande dicta was offered only 22 years after
the passage of the act in question-Desert Land Act of
1877. The unspoken premise is that the passage of 90 years,
combined with changes in the High Court's membership,
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

California v. U.S., upra note 21.
Id.. at 662.
Winters v. U.S., supra note 22, at 577.
Arizona v. California, supra note 23, at 598.
U.S. v. New Mexico, supra note 16, at 700.
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have made the Solicitor more qualified than the Court to
interpret earlier cases."
A second reference to Rio Grande later in the Opinion
reveals a failure to distinguish between the powers retained
by the Congress and those granted to federal agencies. The
Solicitor states:
In summary, since the Federal Government
has never granted away its right to make use of
unappropriated waters on federal lands, it is my
opinion that the United States has retained its
power to vest in itself water rights in unappropriated waters and it may exercise such power
independent of substantive state law. See United
States v. Rio GrandeDam and IrrigationCo., supra;
see also discussion at pp. 15-18.8"
Rio Grande does not stand for the broad proposition
asserted. Limited to its facts, the case can only be viewed
as the Court's explicit recognition that the navigation
servitude is a sufficient basis for the federal government
to enjoin construction of dam and appropriation of water
under state law, where such action threatens the highways
of commerce. Professor Trelease makes a strong argument
that the power described by the Solicitor exists in the United
States (Congress) under the supremacy clause. 1 However
the existence of the power in the Congress does not mean
that such power has been either exercised or granted to the
executive branch of the federal government, i.e., the Department of the Interior.
The Solicitor's questionable treatment of case law continues with references to United States v. New Mexico. "
The Solicitor offers the case as support for the view that the
United States did not "divest itself of its authority, as
sovereign, to use the unappropriated waters on the public
This decision to ignore the current Court's rulings is curious in view of
the Solicitor's claim that "the guidance I must give federal agencies must
be based to a large degree on predicting how the Supreme Court may
resolve [the] conflicting statements contained in prior decisions." OPINION,
supra note 1, at 9.
80. OPINION, supra note 1, at 11.
81. TRELEASE, supra note 4, at 147 et. seq.
82. United States v. New Mexico, supra note 16.
79.
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lands for governmental purposes." 3 The case actually enunciates a much narrower principle. The Solicitor quotes from
U.S. v. New Mexico as follows:
The Court has previously concluded that whatever powers the States acquired over their waters
as a result of congressional Acts and admission into
the Union, however, Congress did not intend thereby
to relinquish its authority to reserve unappropriated water in the future for use on appurtenant
lands withdrawnfrom the public domainfor specific
federal purposes (citations omitted)." (emphasis
added.)
Rather than supporting the breadth of the Solicitor's
congressional purpose doctrine, this is a clear statement
that the reservation doctrine is limited to "lands withdrawn
from the public domain;" and it recognizes that claims to
water attach to "a specific federal purpose." This is simply
a restatement by the Court of the reservation doctrine. The
case does not support a lesser standard for federal water
claims. In fact, four pages later the Court stated Congress
intended that, outside of the umbrella provided by the
reservation doctrine, "the United States would acquire water
in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator.""
Similarly, United States v. District Court for Eagle
County,"0 a case interpreting the scope of the McCarran
Amendment, 8 is cited for the proposition that Congress has
recognized that the federal government may "acquire rights
to use water in ways other than through state law.""8 The
case is also cited as general support for the congressional
purpose doctrine.8" The Solicitor directs attention to the
Court's discussion of the Amendment's phrase, "water rights
by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange,
or otherwise.""0
OPINION, supra note 1, at 9.
84. U.S. v. New Mexico, supra note 16, at 698.
85. Id., at 702.
86. United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
83.

87.
88.

43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
OPINION, supra note 1, at 11.

89. Id., at 15.
90. United States v. District Court for Eagle County, supra note 86, at 524.
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The issue squarely before the Court was whether the
McCarran Amendment encompassed the adjudication of
reserved water rights. The Court held the Amendment to
be all-inclusive, necessarily encompassing reserved rights.
The reference included in the Solicitor's Opinion, when read
in context and properly quoted, is to water rights appropriated "under state law and rights acquired 'by exchange'
or 'by purchase,' which [the Court] assume(s) would normally be appropriative rights."" While the case recognizes
that the Government may obtain water rights through purchase or exchange, it does not support the existence of a
federal appropriative right as implied by the Solicitor. Even
creative reading of the dicta in this case cannot stretch it to
include judicial sanction of the asserted rights.
A citation to the federal district court decision in
Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United States" (hereinafter
Hawthorne) is equally flawed. At issue was the right of the
Government to drill wells within the confines of the Hawthorne Naval Ammunition Depot "in order to provide a
water supply for beneficial uses necessary to accomplishment
of the purposes of said depot."'" The court considered a
supremacy clause analysis of the case depositive of the issue.
The court also noted Nevada legislative acts ceding jurisdiction to the federal government,94 the fact that the area
had been properly withdrawn by executive order," and
national defense,"6 and concluded that state laws need not
be observed. As a federal enclave the United States had
exclusive jurisdiction." These specific circumstances clearly
distinguish the case from the Solicitor's position; there is
not even dictum to support the Opinion. The case was appealed
and judgment affirmed" by the Ninth Circuit, not on the
merits, but on the ground that the McCarran Amendment
of sovereign immunity was inapplicable to the broad relief
91. Id.
92. Nevada ex rel. Shtmberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D.Nev.,
1958) a/i'd on other ground8, 279 F.2d 699 (1960).
93. Id., at 603.
94. Id., at 602.
95. Id., at 601.
96. Id., at 609.
97. See, WHEATLEY, supra note 4, at 74.
98. Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United States, supra note 92.
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sought by Nevada, "[R]elating as Nevada's case did to
sovereign proprietary rights of the state over waters in
general, and not to [the specific] water rights of water
users.'"'" Hawthorne clearly appears to be limited to federal
enclaves, although the court's reliance on the Pelton Dam
case invokes the broader reserved rights doctrine. Hawthorne
does not support a general federal right to appropriate water
in contravention of state water law merely for congressionally authorized uses. "0
The Solicitor also relies on a 1950 Solicitor's Opinion
entitled "Compliance by the Department with State Laws
Concerning Water Rights." '' The Opinion, prepared by
Solicitor White, is expressly based on
[T]he position taken by the executive branch of the
Government in the case of Nebraska v. Wyoming,
(325 U.S. 589), the title to all such water remained
in the United States as the owner of all unappropriated non-navigable water on the public domain.
As the owner of unappropriated non-navigable
water on the public domain, the United States may
exercise all powers of ownership over such water. °2
At issue was a private party's right to construct a
stockwatering reservoir under a permit from the Secretary.
Even with the assertion of absolute ownership Solicitor
White maintained:
Of course, before an officer of the United
States can effectively act to exercise the ownership
of the United States in unappropriated non-navigable water on public land, he must have the proper
authority to do so.
[And] . . . section 4 of the Taylor Grazing
Act (43 U.S.C., 1946 ed., sec. 315c) specificaly provides that reservoirsand other improvements necessary to care and management of livestock for which
'grazing permits have been issued may be constructed-:on public lands within grazing districts
99. See, WHEATLEY, gUpra note 4, at 79.
100. See, id. at 74-79.
101. Memorandum M33969 From The Solicitor to The Director, Bureau of Land
Management, Subject: Compliance by the Department with State laws
concerning water rights (Nov. 7, 1950).
102. Id., at 6.
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under permits issued by the Secretary." 8 (emphasis
added.)
Solicitor White stated that an assertion of federal
ownership, combined with a specific Congressional authorization, justified non-compliance with state law. Further, the
Opinion is limited to non-navigable waters on the public
domain.
Solicitor Krulitz acknowledges in his Opinion that the
Supreme Court declined to decide whether or not the United
States owned the water in Nebraska v. Wyoming."' Nor has
such position ever been sanctioned by the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the Krulitz Opinion's discussion of BLM nonreserved rights contains an explicit rejection of the earlier
Opinion's ownership concepts.
[C]omments concerning 'ownership' of the unappropriated water on the public domain are overly
broad and irrelevant to the right of the United
States to make use of such water, and I disavow
them to the extent inconsistent with the opinion.
.. . [C]oncepts of 'ownership' of unappropriated
waters are not determinative in federal-state relations in non-reserved water rights. (citations
omitted.)1 "
It is difficult to accept Solicitor White's Opinion as
support for the non-reserved rights doctrine. Reason dictates
that rejection by Solicitor Krulitz of the only two premises
supporting Solicitor White's conclusion deprive the White
Opinion of its logical force. It becomes no longer a source
of legal support, but simply an assertion of policy." '
A more forceful argument (not dependent on federal
property interest in water) would be to view the specific
103. Id., at 7.
104.
105.

106.

OPINION, supra note 1. at 7 n. 11, reference to Nebraska v.
U.S. 589, 611-616 (1945).
OPINION, supra note 1, at 66.

Wyom ng

325

Two earlier Solicitor's Opinions were also overruled to the extent they
did not conform to the new right. OPINION, supra note 1, at 67 n.114. They
were 55 I.D. 371 and 55 I.D. 378 (1935). This is not surprising since they
contained statements such as "Having thus surrendered its primary rights
to nonnavigable waters on the public domain, the Federal Government, with
respect to its public lands, stands on the Fame footing as private owners,
and must conform to State Laws governing the appropriation of water."
55 I.D. 378, at 379.
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congressional authorization for the Secretary to build stockwatering ponds as a specific delegation of authority by
Congress. By operation of the supremacy clause, state law
would not be binding on the Secretary. Such a delegation
could be easily analogized to the congressional grant of
authority to the President, authorizing him to make reservations for specific purposes through executive order."' 7
The Solicitor also refers to a non-water rights case
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.' This case is
offered as general support for the property rights theory of
appropriation for congressionally authorized purposes. Further, the Solicitor's Opinion cites Lake Misere for the
principle:
that federal courts may fashion rules of federal
law necessary to carry out important congressionally-authorized programs; ... where state laws do
not provide appropriate standards or unduly interfere with federal programs. 9
Such a reading of Lake Misere is haphazard at best.
This choice-of-law case decided in 1973, was the culmination
of extensive litigation over title to parcels of land originally
purchased by the federal government in 1937 and 1939 pursuant to the Migratory Bird Conservation Act." ' The original
grantor reserved the right to extract minerals for ten years
from the time of purchase. At the end of ten years, the
federal government would have fee title unless minerals
were being produced on the property. In 1940, the Louisiana
State Legislature passed a statute designed to make such
reservations imprescriptible in the case of land transfers to
the United States."' The Supreme Court ruled that the
United States had acquired the mineral rights in spite of the
acts of the 1940 Louisiana Legislature.
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger fashioned
a limited exception to the rule that property transactions
are "local" and that there is no federal common law. He
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

OPINION. supra note 1, at 19, 20.

United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
OPINION, supra note 1, at 16.
41 Stat. 1222, 16 U.S.C. § 711 et. seq.
Louisiana Act 315 of 1940, LA. REv. STAT. § 9:5806A (Supp. 1973).
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justified the decision on the basis that the case "is one
arising from and bearing heavily upon a federal regulatory
program.""' He took pains to point out:
This is not a case where the United States
seeks to oust state substantive law on the basis of
'an amorphous doctrine of national sovereignty'
divorced from any specific constitutional or statutory provision and premised solely on the argument
'that every authorized activity of the United States
represents an exercise of its governmental power,'
(citations omitted) . . . . Here we deal with an
unquestionably appropriate and specific exercise of
congressional regulatory power which fails to specify whether or to what extent it contemplates displacement of state law. 1
The Chief Justice further held that the outcome in these
cases is "dependent upon a variety of considerations always
relevant to the nature of the specific governmental interests
and to the effects upon them of applying state law. 114 In
judging the applicability of state laws the Court suggested
they were "acceptable only 'so long as it is plain, .. .that
the state rules do not effect a discrimination against the
Government, or patently run counter to the terms of the
Act.' "I" The Louisiana Statute was rejected because "land
acquisitions of the United States, explicitly authorized by
the Migratory Bird Conservation Act, are made subject to
a rule ...that is plainly hostile to the interest of the United
States......
The opinion for the Court expressly states that the
decision was affected by the clarity of the specific congressional intent, both in the words of the Act and in the legislative history." ' It observed that their conclusion might be
influenced if the state law "served legitimate and important
state interests the fulfilment of which Congress might have
contemplated through application of state law."'' While
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

U.S. v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., supra note 108, at 592.
Id., at 592-593 n. 10.
Id., at 595.
Id., at 596.
Id., at 596-597.
Id., at 597.
Id., at 599.
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no such finding was justified in the Lake Misere case, the
Supreme Court has found such congressional recognition of
state water law.'1 9
The Solicitor's apparent disregard of congressional intent in the context of federal-state relations is contrary to
the Supreme Court reasoning in United States v. New
Mexico."' In that case, the Majority held that careful
examination of federal reserved rights claims was necessary
because of the history of congressional intent with respect
to jurisdiction over the allocation of water. "Where Congress
has expressly addressed the question of whether federal
entities must abide by state water law, it has almost invariably deferred to the state law.' 21 Mr. Justice Powell's
Opinion, dissenting in part, concurred with the Majority's
analysis of "Congress' general policy of deference to state
water law.""..2
The Court's finding of "historical deference" is discarded
on the basis of the Solicitor's view that the 37 statutes
referenced by the Court do not support their conclusion. -3
An almost identical approach was taken in a Stanford Law
Review article," 4 shortly after the New Mexico decision, in
which the author argued that "historical deference" was an
illusion. Even though the article strongly advocates that a
federal agency has the right to obtain water for secondary
purposes of federal reservations, the author concludes that
the combined impact of the companion decisions in California
and New Mexico is that the Supreme Court believes that it is
the intent of Congress that federal agencies comply with
substantive and procedural state law. "[I]nterpreting the
conformance
Court's language as only mandating procedural
5
to state law would 'trivialize' its effect."1
Again, in an advocacy posture, the Solicitor quotes
Cappaert v. United States, that "federal water rights are
119.

U.S. v. New Mexico, supra note 16, at 702 n. 5.

120.

Id., at 701.

121. Id., at 702.
122. Id., at 718 (dissenting opinion).
123. OPINION, supra note 1, at 10 n. 16.
124. Machmeier, Federal Acquisition of Non-Reserved Water Rights after New
Mexico, 31 STAN. L. REV. 885, 909-910 (1979).

125.

Id., at 887-888 n. 7.
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not dependent on state law or state procedures .
,.126This
is offered to counter the Court's holding in United States v.
New Mexico that as to non-reserved rights the federal agencies must "acquire water in the same manner as any other
public or private appropriator.' 27 The quotation from Cappaert is inappropriate; Cappaert was a reserved rights case
and did not even approach non-reserved rights issues.'28
The Solicitor's Opinion goes on to cite California v.
United States... for the proposition that states may exercise
authority over federal property or programs in a manner
"not inconsistent with congressional directives."' 3 ° A close
reading of the case shows that the word 'clear' which appears
in the Court's opinion has been omitted from the quoted
passage. The Court refers to "clear Congressional directive.''
(emphasis added) Again, the Solicitor has disregarded the theme of specificity in congressional intent. 3 '
Turning to a recent Supreme Court case, the Solicitor
relies on Kleppe v. New Mexico 3 ' for the proposition that
[O]nly Congress has the authority under the Property Clause to control the disposition and use of
water appurtenant to lands owned by the United
States.
[S]ince Congress has vested only the public
with the right to appropriate unappropriated water
...on,... federally-owned lands under state law,
the United States itself retains a proprietary interest in those waters.... The United States therefore retains the power to utilize those unappropriated waters to carry out the management objectives specified in congressional directives .... Any
legislation enacted by Congress to accomplish man126. OPINION, supra note 1, at 17.
127. U.S. v. New Mexico, supra note 16, at 702.
128. Cappaert dealt only with the protection of a federal agency's claim to the
minimum amount of water necessary to accomplish the purposes of a
specific reservation oC land. New Mexico, on the other hand dealt not only
with water legitimately claimed under the reserve right doctrine, but
agency claims in excess of that amount. The New Mexico language has
more force in the context of the new right asserted by the Solicitor.
129. California v. U.S., supra note 21.
130. OPINION, supra note 1, at 17.

131. California v. U.S., supra note 21, at 672.
132. See, part II, infra.
133. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
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agement objectives on federal lands preempts conflicting state regulations or laws as a result of the
operation of the Property and Supremacy Clauses
of the United States Constitution. See Kleppe v.
New Mexico.' (emphasis added.)
This is an extremely broad conclusion to draw from a
case that is not even remotely related to water. In Kleppe
the Court concluded that the federal Wild Free-Roaming
Horses and Burros Act' " " preempted enforcement of the
New Mexico estray law as it related to the immediate facts.
The Solicitor's reference to a retained proprieary interest is either a reference to property theories of water
law, or an attempt to directly parallel the Court's treatment
of wild horses and burros on public lands. It is unlikely that
the Solicitor would use this case to support the proprietary
view of federal water claims since his opinion appears to
reject federal ownership as a basis for the claim. "6 Also
federal ownership of the animals was not considered by the
Court, "The Secretary makes no claim here, however, that
the United States owns the wild free-roaming horses and
burros found on public land."' 37
Nor can any parallel between the Court's treatment of
wild horses and burros on the public lands and the newly
asserted federal right of appropriation for congressional
purpose be drawn. The Kleppe decision arose in the context
of a statute specifically directing the Secretaries of Interior
and Agricuture "to protect and manage [the animals] as
components of the public lands . . . in a manner that is
designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands.... Much of the Court's
opinion is devoted to recounting the explicit nature of the
congressional intent in protecting the horses and burros.
This is necessary because the Court recognizes that "determinations under the Property Clause are entrusted primarily
to the judgment of Congress.' 3 8 State jurisdiction was a
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

OPINION, supra note 1, at 16.
85 Stat. 649, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1970 ed. Supp. IV).
OPINION, supra note 1, at 66, 67.
Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra note 133, at 537 n. 8.
Id., at 531.
Id., at 536.
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specific consideration. "Absent consent or cession a State
undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within
its territory, but Congress equally surely retains the power
to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the
Property Clause." (citations omitted)14 ° The operation of
the supremacy clause necessarily required that the specific
congressional enactment prevail."' But the Court goes on to
observe "that 'without more,' federal ownership of lands
within a State does not withdraw those lands from the
jurisdiction of the State."' 2 The "more" in the Kleppe case
is a specific congressional act, clearly intended to preempt
state law in the event of actual conflict. The Kleppe Court
openly declined to43 decide whether the Act could be sustained
in all instances.'
Congress has not chosen to pass a statute analogous to
Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act directing the
Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture to manage waters
arising on, under, through or appurtenant to federally owned
lands as "components of the public lands. 1 . 4 Absent such
an act of Congress, or similar expression of intent in a
specific context, the reasoning used in Kleppe cannot support
a general federal agency right to appropriate water for
management objectives.
The Solicitor's Opinion also relies on the National Water
Commission Final Report. 4 ' The Opinion quotes the report
as saying:
Federal agencies [can make] some water uses
that neither comply with state law nor can be
justified under the reservation doctrine. The power
of Federal agencies to make such uses cannot be
denied under the Supremacy Clause, if the water
has been taken through the exercise of constitutional power."'
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id., at 543.
Id., at 543.
Id., at 544.
Id., at 546.
The BLM Organic Act does not contain language remotely suggesting such
an intent.

145.

NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CON[hereinafter COMMISSION].
GRESS, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE (1973)

146. OPINION, supra note 1, at 16.
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The first sentence is taken out of context and misquoted. Among the recommendations submitted by the Commission was a proposed National Water Rights Procedures
Act. Commission Recommendation No. 13-4 suggests that
the proposed act is a means for integrating existing federal
water claims into state administrative structures. It contains
absolutely no reference to the asserted appropriation for congressionally-authorized purposes. The full text of the sentence in question is: "Recommendation 13-4 recognizes that
Federal agencies may also have made some water uses that
neither comply with State law nor can be justified under
the reservation doctrine."' 47 (emphasis added) The underlined portions were deleted or altered by the drafters of the
Solicitor's Opinion. Viewing the sentence in context and with
its actual language reduces it from a legal conclusion to a
tentative statement of fact. The second quoted sentence is
a simple statement of the operation of the supremacy clause.
No one would argue that federal agencies derive their
powers directly from the constitution. Federal agencies have
the right to "make such uses" only if Congress, acting pursuant to a constitutional power, has properly delegated the
necessary authority to them.
The Solicitor relies on recognized scholars, including
Professor Trelease."' The Solicitor refers to the Professor's
conclusion, that: "[I]n-so-far as the federal purpose, right,
law and power is valid and operative on reserved lands, it is
valid and operative on any federal land no matter where
located or how acquired."'" 9 The argument is based on a
forceful supremacy clause analysis which purports to show
that "the 'reservation doctrine' is a superfluity,"'' 0 and that
a careful reading of the cases shows the supremacy clause
theory as the actual basis for the reservation doctrine."'
Since this conclusion does not necessarily support, and may
even go beyond, the Solicitor's Opinion, it is doubtful that
the Solicitor truely wishes to embrace the Professor's theory.
Furthermore, acceptance of the supremacy clause theory
147.

148.
149.
150.
151.

supra note 145, at 466.
TRELEASE, supra note 4.
Id., at 147.
Id., at 143.
Id., at 138, et. seq.
CoMMIssioN,
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does not automatically lead to the conclusion that Congress
has delegated its power to the Department of Interior to
appropriate water, independent of state law, for every congressionally authorized program."'
The Solicitor's reference to two sections of Wheatley's
Study of the Development, the Management, and Use of
Water Resources on the Public Lands"' is more perplexing.
The first reference is to a discussion of federal enclaves.
Without reaching a final conclusion, Wheatley discusses
four alternative theories for determining what law to apply
when there is no federal statutory or common law, such as
in water disputes. Wheatley evaluates Nevada ex rel.
Shamberger v. U. S.'5 4 as less than satisfactory because it
does not provide "a rule of law which determines when
compensable property interests of the non-federal parties
are affected..... Indeed Wheatley's conclusion is diametricaly opposed to the Solicitor's generalized use of Nevada
ex rel. Shamberger. After assessing the court's opinion,
Wheatley states that "It should be clear that the Hawthorne
case provided none of the answers, except that the state
could not interfere with 6the use of waters from wells on
the ammunition depot.'5
The second reference is to a discussion of two lower
federal court decisions which considered the reservation
doctrine."' According to Wheatley these decisions produced
"inconclusive results." More important the context of
Wheatley's comments, directed to developing rules of law
defining compensable vested rights, makes it clear that he
was largely concerned with the development of non-Indian
reserved rights as a financial doctrine. There is absolutely
no reference to the kind of rights asserted by the Solicitor.
The case law and authorities offered to support the
Solicitor's independent federal right of appropriation based
152. See discussion of theoretical basis.
153. WHEATLEY, supra note 4.
154. Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. U.S., supra note 92.
155. WHEATLEY, supra note 4, at 79.
156. WHEATLEY, supra note 4, at 80.
157. WHEATLEY, supra note 4, at 112, discusses Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v.
U.S., supra note 92 and an unreported order without opinion issued by the
District Court of Utah. Glenn v. United States, Civil No. C-153-61 (D.
Utah, Mar. 16, 1963).
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on congressionally authorized purposes offer superficial
support at best. In several instances they actually undermine the Solicitor's position. The effect of the Solicitor's
sources is to increase concern about the functional dimensions of the congressional purpose doctrine.
IV.

PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE OPINION

Solicitor Krulitz's Opinion concludes that under the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act,15 ' Congress
"authorized the United States to appropriate unappropriated
water available on the public domain as of October 21, 1976,
to meet the new management objectives dictated in the
Act. 15 ° The management objectives referred to by the Secretary are broad ranging (mineral and fiber production to
preservation of scenic and ecological values)."'°
Assume arguendo that the right asserted by the Solicitor
exists and that FLPMA is sufficient to trigger its application. Remember that this right is initiated by application
to use and the purpose and quantity of the use are its limitations. Further, the right is independent of the contours of
state substantive law, including requirements of diversion
and beneficial use.
158. 43 U.S.C. § 1701, et. seq. (Supp. 1979).
159. OPINION, supra note 1, at 69.
160. Section 102 of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 reads in part:
(a) The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United
States that (1) the public lands be retained in Federal ownership, unless
as a result of the land use planning procedure provided for in this
Act, it is determined that disposal of a particular parcel will serve
the national interest;
(2) the national interest will be best realized if the public
lands and their resources are periodically and systematically inventoried and their present and future use is projected through
a land use planning process coordinated with other Federal and
State planning efforts;
(7) goals and objectives be established by law as -guidelines
for public land use planning, and that management be-on the -basis -.
of multiple use and sustained. yield unless otherwise specified by
law;
(8) the public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological
values; that, where appropriate, will preserve and protect certain
public lands in their natural condition; that will provide food and
habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will
provide for outdoor recreation and human occupancy-and -use ... ;
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Consider a possible situation in State X which does not
recognize instream flows or most other non-consumptive
uses as beneficial. The BLM controls a tract of land containing coal, oil and gas, rangeland, free-roaming horses
and burros, timber, fish and other wildlife. A major stream
crosses the tract and natural springs and potential water
well sites abound. The tract is bordered by private appropriators and Forest Service lands. Assume the following
sequence of events.
1976:
1978:

1979:
1980:
1981:
1982:

1983:
1995:

FLPMA passes.
BLM files claims with the state for: wildlife and horse and burro water; instream
flows for fish and waterfowl; maintenance of timber; secondary recovery of oil
(through private party as agent for BLM
director) ; preservation of scenic areas and
a waterfall; and a fish hatchery.
Appropriation by Forest Service for secondary purposes of reservation (1/2 under
state law, 1/2 under federal right).
Appropriation under state law by private
appropriators (downstream and upstream).
Appropriation by BLM to irrigate pasture
to produce hay for winter feeding of elk
herd (four months use), 50% return flow.
Appropriation by downstream private party under state law. Stream now fully appropriated and return flows from BLM are
critical to this appropriation.
BLM closes fish hatchery and apparently
lets water return to non-use.
BLM wants to change irrigation water to
year-round use and reactivate fishing claim
for coal processing and surface-mined land
reclamation. Also wants to change point of
diversion on wildlife instream flows and
convert a portion of instream flows to consumptive use for expanded wild horse and
burro population.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980

29

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 15 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 2
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XV

Both the Forest Service and the private appropriators
believe their rights will be damaged by BLM's actions. What
court is appropriate and what doctrines will be applied? Is
it possible to advise each of the parties of their legal rights
or to predict the possible results of litigation?
A private appropriator, independently or acting through
the state government, cannot use the McCarran Amendment
as a basis for jurisdiction to contest a single BLM appropriation. The McCarran Amendment"' is only useful in the
case of stream-wide adjudications. Private party litigants
can seldom justify this expense. As to the dispute between
the Forest Service and Interior, jurisdiction rests in the
federal courts. However, litigation between these parties
will impact the private parties. Private appropriators will
necessarily attempt to intervene, but with justifiable fears
that they are entering a legal wilderness without a compass.
Assuming this question could be brought into a court
of competent jurisdiction,' - the conceptual problem of defining a line of demarcation between federal and non-federal
rights remains. Interior could argue that the federal rights
are paramount, that subsequent non-federal rights fail and
that prior "vested" rights will be compensated. But this
begs the question until the dimensions of the federal rights
are determined. As Wheatley observed in another context,
"The doctrinal necessity is to discover a source of substantive
rules, with as much certainty as the physical situation permits.'' No detailed federal common law exists in this area
and Congress has not tailored any rule, nor is it likely to do
so. ' 4 Since the federal right is independent of state substantive laws on "diversion" and "beneficial use"'' it is equally
independent of state laws governing preference of use,
abandonment, change in point of diversion and change in use.
161. 43 U.S.C. 666.
162. Jurisdictional questions are equally interesting in the context of a suit
between two state law appropriators in state court and a federal agency
wishes to intervene to protect its federal appropriative rights.
163. WHEATLEY, supra note 4, at 78.
164. The only federal common law of water that exists relates to interstate
allocation of water. See, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
165. OPINIoN, supra note 1, at 16.
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Will the rules of decision spring forth full grown from the
head of Zeus?
The Solicitor's Opinion dismisses this problem with two
assertions: (1) the federal courts can fashion the necessary
rules of federal law,1"6 and (2) "that most of the United
States appropriative (or non-reserved) water rights are
recognized under the water law of most of the Western
'
states, . ..no conflict . . . should generally exist."167
This
comment has previously discussed the Solicitor's remarks on
the federal court's ability to fashion common law rules. The
Solicitor's second assertion reflects a lack of detailed thought
about the administration of Western water rights. State
recognition of a right does not equate to acceptance of the
specific definition offered by the federal agency. Furthermore, the major conflicts will not be with the state system
but with private appropriators who are operating within
the state system, while federal agencies operate under an
ill-defined alternative federal system.
Returning to the hypothetical, consider the court's problem in evaluating the appropriative claims filed by BLM in
1978. Since BLM's notice to the state is not strictly required
by law, it cannot automatically be the priority date. According to the Solicitor's Opinion, priority date is set by date of
actual use pursuant to congressional directives. Therefore
any existing use, within the scope of FLPMA would have
as a priority date, the date of the Act's passage. All of the
1978 filings are properly within the broad language of
FLPMA. This may result in federal water rights for purposes which the BLM State Director never intended to
appropriate water. For instance, the BLM Land Use Plan
for this tract may anticipate instream flows to support fish
and waterfowl at level X, but the actual water in the stream
supports a level of X + 2. Since X + 2 is the actual use and
within the goals of FLPMA, the Solicitor's Opinion would
support the greater appropriative right.
Suddenly, the court is considering the very issues confronting early Western courts; i.e., what are the necessary
166. Id.
167. Id., at 17.
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elements of an appropriation and what are the "first steps"
necessary to manifest an intent to appropriate water?.. 8
Similarly, the Solicitor's assertion that federal rights
are independent of state definitions of diversion and beneficial use does not solve problems, it creates them. Independence from state definition does not mean that the definitions are unnecessary, it means only that the federal courts
must create their own. Federal courts are unlikely to say
that every use, even if wasteful is beneficial or acceptable.
The goals and objectives set forth in FLPMA are so broad
that they do not provide a clear guide as to what Congress
considered an acceptable use. Analogous reasoning applies
to "diversion" and other substantive state provisions.
Equally thorny problems are created by the dependence
of downstream private appropriators on the BLM return
flows; conversion of instream flows to consumptive use for
stockwater; and changes in point of diversion. Federal courts
will be forced to formulate doctrines to handle all of these
issues and many more. The net result will be an independent
body of federal law to govern these newly asserted rights.
This system would be applied to streams already regulated
by state water systems.
In pragmatic terms the Solicitor is suggesting that
Congress intended to subject a single stream to two inconsistent rules without a rational basis for resolving inconsistencies. It is difficult to believe that the Solicitor, the
Supreme Court, or the Congress really intended such a result.
DAVID

168. Harkey v. Smith, 31 N.M. 521, 247 P. 550 (1926)
26 Nev. 229, 67 P. 914 (1902).
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